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Introduction and Background
Both rich and developing countries are experiencing dramatic changes in population
age structure as a consequence of the demographic transition, post-world war II 
baby booms and busts, the emergence of very low fertility, and continuing 
improvements in life expectancy.  All these changes combine transitory swings in 
age distribution with a secular trend toward aging populations.  These changes 
bring both opportunities for intensified investments in human and physical capital to
promote economic growth and challenges as support systems for the elderly are 
stressed and labor force growth slows or turns negative. Investment in human 
capital through mass formal education has increased dramatically in both 
developing countries over the past century and rich industrial nations over the past 
two centuries. On the one hand, increased human capital substitutes for the 
reduced supply of workers, and on the other hand the increase may be closely tied 
to the demographic forces that are leading to population aging, declining fertility 
and mortality. Health is another dimension of human capital, and investments in it 
have grown dramatically as well. 
In Lee and Mason (2010) we used a stylized three age group OLG model in the spirit
of Becker and Barro (1988), calibrated on data for nineteen countries around the 
world from the National Transfers Account project (NTA), to simulate the relation 
between human capital investment and demographic change over the demographic
transition.  We investigated the extent to which increased quality of workers might 
offset the falling support ratio due to slowing growth of quantity of labor. We found 
that under some plausible parameter values higher human capital could 
substantially offset the lower growth trajectory of workers. One goal of this paper is 
to refine and to elaborate on the analysis of human capital.  We carry out a more 
detailed analysis of the relation of human capital spending to demographic and 
economic change.  We are able to draw on data for 39 NTA countries, in contrast to 
the nineteen with the necessary data in the 2010 study, permitting a more detailed 
analysis, treating public expenditures and private expenditures separately, and 
considering the role of per capita income as well as fertility and child dependency in
relation to human capital spending.  The analysis is used in a more realistic 
simulation that shows how human capital investment has varied in relation to the 
changing demography from 1950 to the present, and how it might be expected to 
change over the rest of this century, particularly up to 2050. 
A second goal of this paper is to provide a more comprehensive model that 
incorporates both human and physical capital.  In our past work, we have treated 
these separately while acknowledging the importance of both.  Here we consider 
both. This will improve our understanding of the economic implications of the 
demographic dividend and particularly the “second demographic dividend”, the 
term we use to refer to a second round of adjustments for the changing population 
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age distributions over the demographic transition, including investment in human 
and physical capital, and increasing female labor supply.1 
At the end of this paper we compare our approach and results to those from a 
similar study by Ashraf, Weil and Wilde (2013). 2
Implementation and key results
The objectives of the paper are realized by simulating the development of a 
hypothetical economy during its transition from very high fertility and poverty to 
low fertility and higher standards of living.  Realistic demography is incorporated 
into the model by using UN population estimates and projections for Nigeria, where 
the TFR remains above six births per woman.  The economic model is generic, 
designed to capture important connections between population and economic 
development that are highlighted in the literature on demographic dividends.  With 
minor exception, the model parameters are based on previous research and 
updated estimates of the relationship between human capital investment and 
fertility based on National Transfer Accounts data for many countries.  The 
economic model does not incorporate any idiosyncratic features of the Nigerian 
economy.
A baseline simulation tracks economic outcomes in the event that fertility does not 
decline from its current level.  This simulation is of interest only as a baseline 
against which we can compare alternative fertility scenarios.  Any differences 
between simulations are attributable only to differences in fertility and the 
accompanying changes in human capital.  It should be kept in mind, however, that 
fertility decline interacts with other variables in influencing the pace of 
development.  Two of the fertility scenarios are based on alternative UN population 
projections – the medium and low fertility scenarios for Nigeria.  The third scenario 
explores the possibility of radical fertility decline based on the experience in China 
during its unprecedented fertility transition.  
The analysis shows fertility decline accompanied by an increase in human capital 
spending provides a substantial boost to economic growth.  Some of the 
enhancement comes over the first thirty years as a consequence of the first 
demographic dividend.  Given the low or medium fertility scenario per capita 
consumption will grow more rapidly by 0.4 to 0.6 percentage points between 2010 
and 2040.  The biggest gains come later, however.  Per capita consumption growth 
is higher by about 1.5 percentage points between 2040 and 2100, the end point of 
the simulation.  The large gains are a consequence of the second demographic 
dividend – the economic growth due to greater investment in physical and human 
1 Terminology differs, and some analysts include these effects in a single “demographic 
dividend”. 
2 David Weil, one of the authors of this paper, suggested that we include a simulation of the 
effects of the United Nations Low Fertility scenario which would make it possible to compare 
results to the Ashraf, Weil and Wilde (2013) paper. This comparison is now included. 
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capital.  Radical fertility decline would produce gains that come earlier and would be
substantially greater.  
Background: Human capital and economic growth
Does human capital foster economic growth? 
A large literature has investigated the influence of education on economic growth 
through cross-national regressions (see review by Hanushek and Woessmann, 2010,
2012). Measuring educational attainment by mean years of schooling, as in the 
Barro-Lee (2010) data set, cross-national regressions typically find a robust positive 
effect on the rate of economic growth. Results are strengthened by refinement of 
the measure of educational attainment (Lutz, Cuaresma et al. 2008). These effects 
are even stronger and more consistent when a measure of cognitive ability is used 
in place of grade attainment (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2010, 2012). There are 
critics of this line of research (Wolf 2004; Aghion, Boustan et al. 2009). In this paper 
we will simply assume that human capital (past investments in health and 
education) enters an aggregate production function as will be explained later and, 
thereby, contributes to economic growth. 
Measurement
National Transfer Accounts takes a different approach than the studies mentioned 
above. The NTA estimates are based on estimates of public and private education 
and health expenditures on individuals by single years of age. Total human capital 
investment in each year is equal to total public and private spending on education 
and health of children and, in the case of education, young adults.  Human capital 
of each cohort depends on the cumulative investment in the human capital to date 
in that cohort adjusted to reflect the extent to which members of the cohort are 
members of the workforce.  Investment in human capital and the stock of human 
capital are, thus, treated in a fashion very similar to investment and the stock of 
physical capital.
Our NTA measure of human capital investment is dictated by the NTA accounting 
framework which provides comprehensive estimates of the costs or economic 
resources devoted to achieving education and health outcomes. NTA estimates do 
not include the value of the time of students nor do they include the value of the 
time of parents or grandparents who surely contribute to human capital of children 
and grandchildren.  
The NTA educational expenditure measure described above should contain some 
useful information about quality of education, an important dimension. It also allows
us to consider public and private investment data separately which may not be so 
important for European countries but which is extremely important in some other 
parts of the world such as East Asia, where private spending exceeds public in 
China, Taiwan, and South Korea although not Japan. 
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Fertility and Human Capital: The quantity-quality tradeoff
Becker’s (1959) seminal paper introduced the idea that parents care about both the
number and quality of their children, but the implications of this insight were not 
developed until Becker and Lewis (1973) and Willis (1973).  Prettner, Bloom et al. 
(2013) build on these insights in a more recent study.  These analyses developed 
the consequences of the multiplicative interaction of quantity and quality of children
in the family budget constraint, with each affecting the shadow price of the other. 
The demand for both numbers of children and average quality per child are posited 
to have positive income elasticities. However, the income elasticity of quality is 
assumed to be higher than that of quantity, and because each affects the shadow 
price of the other, expenditures on quality per child rise while the number of 
children falls. In this account the rise in quality and fall in quantity are both caused 
by the rise in income. However, we could easily imagine circumstances in which 
exogenous influences on fertility such as access to superior contraception, or on 
quality such as public subsidies of schools, might result in a fertility change causing 
a change in quality, or the reverse. We expect that actual changes in income, 
fertility, and human capital will be reflecting some degree of causality through each 
of these channels.
In these analyses (for example, Becker, 1981) the “quality” of a child was just a 
shorthand way of referring to parental expenditures on the child. Significantly, 
Becker and Barro (1988:9) distinguish between “child-rearing costs that do not 
involve human capital” and parental expenditures on a child that do raise its human
capital and influence the wage the child earns later in life, noting that “Practically 
all families invest in the human capital of children - a form of ‘bequest’ that is far 
more common than transfers of assets”. In our implementation of the quantity-
quality tradeoff and investment in human capital of children, we are guided by this 
important distinction. We distinguish between parental expenditures on health and 
education per child, which we consider to be human capital enhancing, and the 
remainder of expenditures per child, for example on housing, food, clothing, 
entertainment and recreation. 
The quantity-quality tradeoff theory was originally intended to apply to decisions 
about private expenditures on human capital. However, it is arguable that the 
private demand for education drives public expenditures on it, in which case it 
would be subject to the same sort of quantity-quality tradeoff as private 
expenditures on education. In addition, we believe that cultural, historical and 
political differences across countries and regions influence the relative roles of 
public and private spending on education. 
Parents must take public expenditures on education and health as given when they 
make their own private decisions about their own expenditures for these. However, 
it is not obvious how this would play out. We might suppose that parents would 
choose higher fertility when there is a public human capital subsidy because it 
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would reduce the shadow price of quantity (due to the reduced average price of 
quality). But perhaps complementary private expenditures are needed to take 
advantage of public education (transportation, school uniforms and books, medical 
certificates) such that private expenditures on quality end up being higher than 
before the subsidy, and fertility lower. There might be an income effect since the 
government now pays for at least a part of quality, but taxes would have to be 
raised at the same time and the net outcome is not clear. If there is an income 
effect on fertility, the theory predicts it will lead to lower fertility and higher quality. 
The upshot is that theory gives no clear prediction on how public education might 
affect fertility and private spending on education. 
Human Capital and the Second Demographic Dividend
Changing population age distributions across the demographic transition have been 
mainly driven by changes in fertility and mortality. One aspect of these changes is 
the decreasing share of children in the population once fertility falls, a decrease 
partially offset by increasing child survival.3 The quantity-quality theory leads us to 
expect that expenditures per child on health and education will correspondingly 
rise. The compositional benefits of the rising support ratio in mid-transition are only 
transitory, but to the extent that these same age distribution changes also promote 
increased investment in physical and human capital, the gains may be preserved 
and amplified. In particular, rising investments in human capital may raise the 
quality and productivity of the work force and offset the decline in relative numbers 
of workers, at least in part. 
A growing empirical literature has explored these possibilities.4 Lee and Mason 
(2010), described earlier, used NTA data for 19 countries to estimate an elasticity of
-1.05, not significantly different than -1, between total fertility and the sum of public
and private human capital expenditure per child. In their model, human capital 
spending in each country was expressed in YoLY, that is years of average labor 
income for ages 30 to 49. This measure was then regressed on the period Total 
Fertility Rate (TFR) five years earlier in a double log specification. 
3 At the very start of the transition, fertility typically remains high as mortality begins to 
decline, which leads to a rising share of children in the population. 
4 There have been two recent simulation studies of OLG models with endogenous education. 
In Prettner and Prskawetz (2009) young workers choose fertility and human capital 
investment per child, but their model does not include public or private transfers to the 
elderly who instead rely on earlier savings. The outcome is that lower fertility and population
aging go with higher investment in human capital and intensification of physical capital and 
therefore higher per capita income. The question whether increased human capital 
compensates for and offsets the reduced share of the working age population does not arise,
and the focus of the paper is instead on the relative wages of younger and older workers 
who are not perfect substitutes. A study by Fougère et al (2009) develops a more elaborate 
OLG model with endogenous education, but education decisions do not depend in this model
on the exogenous level of fertility. Thus these interesting studies are not relevant for this 
paper.
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Capital and the Second Demographic Dividend
Lower fertility and slower population growth promote investment in human capital 
per child as we have just seen, and they also lead to increases in the amount of 
physical capital per worker. There are several ways to see this, from the 
compositional effect of population aging, from the perspective of individual 
behavior, and from a macroeconomic perspective. 
In all countries in the NTA dataset, asset income rises strongly with age which 
indicates that asset holdings rise strongly with age as well, reflecting the tendency 
for adults to save and accumulate assets as they age. People accumulate assets for 
many reasons – to provide for consumption in old age, as a buffer against health 
costs and other unforeseen financial needs, to leave a bequest for descendants, or 
for any number of other reasons. As a population ages and the ratio of elderly to 
working age population rises, this age pattern of asset holdings means that the ratio
of assets to workers and to the general population also rises. If the economy is at 
least partially closed, and if some part of the assets is held in the form of capital, 
then the productivity of workers may be raised. In any event, asset income per 
capita will rise, raising per capita income. This is the compositional effect. In 
addition, we might expect increased saving and asset accumulation for behavioral 
reasons arising from fewer children and longer life (Lee, Mason and Miller, 2003). 
Population aging also affects saving or capital per worker in macroeconomic 
models, with results of course depending on the assumptions made. The simplest 
setup is the Solow growth model with a constant aggregate net saving rate. In this 
case, the slower population growth that generates population aging implies an 
increase in capital per worker. An alternative assumption is that the capital-output 
ratio remains constant, which is approximately true over fairly long periods in OECD
countries, but has not held recently and has been strongly challenged by Piketty 
(2014). On this assumption, the capital-labor ratio increases but less so than under 
the constant saving rate assumption.  In addition, the saving rate is reduced just 
enough to keep the capital-output ratio constant allowing for an additional effect on 
consumption.  With either constant savings rate or constant capital-output ratio, 
slower population growth generates a “second dividend” with higher consumption 
(Lee, Mason, et al. 2013). In our simulations to be described in a later section, we 
will assume that the capital-output ratio is constant.
The Quantity-Quality Tradeoff in NTA data
National Transfer Accounts provides estimates of public and private spending on 
health and education by age.  In Lee and Mason (2010) we used a synthetic cohort 
measure of human capital investment constructed by summing over age in the 
cross-sectional profile of health expenditure from ages 0 to 175 and for educational 
expenditure from 3 to 26.  These sums were then expressed in YoLYs (the years of 
5 For health, ages greater than 17 are excluded because of ambiguity about the treatment of
maternal health care.  Should it be counted as human capital income in the mother?  The 
child?  We have elected to exclude it.  
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average labor income of an adult 30-49).  For example, in the US in 2003 average 
labor income per adult for those 30-49 was $47,116.  The human capital investment
in raising a child, based on our synthetic cohort measure was $182,000 or 3.9 
YoLYs.  In contrast, the human capital cost of a child in Kenya in 2005 was $3684 or 
1.3 YolYs .  Measured In YoLYs, the US was investing 3 times as much in human 
capital as was Kenya.  Measured in ppp dollars, the US was investing 50 times as 
much as Kenya.  
One motivation for expressing human capital investment in YoLYs is that it allows 
direct comparison of the allocation decisions of countries with very different levels 
of income.  Another potentially important use is that it controls in a crude fashion 
for across country variation in labor costs, very important in education and health.  
Per capita spending by age for health and education, public and private, is 
presented in Figure 1.  The left panel is the average value for 15 high income 
countries while the right panel is the average value for 24 middle and low income 
countries.  (See the appendix for a complete list of countries and selected data for 
those countries.)  Spending per child in YoLYs is higher in high income countries.  
Human capital spending is somewhat elevated for infants due to health care 
spending.  In both country groups, human capital spending rises sharply with age as
children enter school and declines as children and young adults depart school.  
Government spending on education (CGE) followed by familial spending on 
education (CFE) are the largest components of human capital spending.  In the high 
income countries, public human capital spending (CGE+CGH) is greater at all ages 
than private spending (CFE+CFH), but that is not the case in middle and lower 
income countries included in our data.   In general, private spending is more 
important relative to public spending in middle and lower income countries than in 
high income countries.  For older youth, private spending on health and education 
exceeds public spending in middle and lower income countries.  
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Figure 1.  Components of human capital spending by age (0-26) in high-income (left
figure) and middle- and low-income (right figure) countries:  Private education 
(CFE), private health (CFH), public education (CGe), and public health (CGH).   All 
values expressed in YoLYs – average of labor income per person age 30-49.  Source:
Calculated by authors.  File:  ntadata.xlsx 
Synthetic cohort values of human capital spending are reported for high income 
countries and middle and low income countries in Table 1.  In high income countries
human capital spending is 4.4 YoLYs on average and 2.8 YoLYs in middle and low 
income countries.  As is apparent in the age profiles presented above, expenditure 
on education is far more important than health in both country groups.  For every 
YoLY devoted to health we see about six YoLYs devoted to education in high income
countries and four YoLYs in middle and low income countries.  
Education Health Total
Public 3.02 0.50 3.52
Private 0.72 0.13 0.85
Total 3.74 0.63 4.37
Public 1.37 0.28 1.65
Private 0.86 0.24 1.10
Total 2.23 0.52 2.75
High income
Middle and low income
Table 1.  Spending on human capital, synthetic cohort values, 
expressed in YoLYs.
The public sector is dominant in high income countries accounting for about 80 
percent of human capital spending.  The public sector in middle and low income 
countries accounts for about 60 percent of human capital spending.  A very 
surprising feature of these data is that the human capital spending advantage of 
high income countries (measured in YoLYs) is entirely due to public spending.  
Private spending is greater for both health and education in middle and low income 
countries than it is in high income countries.  
The shift in human capital investment from private to public hands is a very 
important phenomenon.  We explore this further in Figure 2 by plotting the share of 
human capital spending from public sources against the natural log of YoLY.  When 
we normalize on the YoLY, as in Figure 1, the unit or currency is irrelevant so long 
as the numerator and denominator are the same.  Here, however, the YoLY is being 
used as an age-independent comparative measure of development and it is 
necessary to use a common currency.  For this purpose we have used US dollars in 
thousands to construct the YoLY.  There is a great deal of variation in the 
importance of the public sector, but reliance on the public sector clearly increases 
as countries develop.  A striking feature of the results presented in Figure 2 is that 
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the diversity is much diminished among high income countries.  In continental 
Europe public spending is clearly more important and private spending less 
important than in other high income countries.  
Figure 2.  Public human capital spending as a percentage of total human capital 
spending versus the natural log of YoLYs measured in $US 1000s.  Human capital 
spending are synthetic cohort measures as described in the text.  Source:  National 
Transfer Accounts www.ntaccounts.org.  File:  ntadata.xlsx.  
Human capital spending is particularly salient in aging societies because they have 
very low fertility and the quantity-quality tradeoff therefore implies high human 
capital investment.  Under these circumstances, aging populations will have smaller
cohorts of workers but ones in whom much more has been invested.  The simple 
relationship between fertility (quantity) and human capital investment (quality) can 
be seen in Figure 3 which plots the synthetic measure of human capital expenditure
in YoLYs against the total fertility rates for the 39 countries in our cross-sectional 
data. This figure is an update of a similar figure based on NTA data for 19 countries 
in Lee and Mason (2010).  The estimated elasticity is -0.74 – a one percent decline 
in fertility leads to a 0.74 percent increase in human capital spending per child.  
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Figure 3.  Total human capital spending versus total fertility, 39 countries.  Fitted 
line is constructed by regressing ln of human capital on ln TFR.  Estimated elasticity 
is -0.74.  Source:  Calculated by authors.  File: ntadata.xlsx 
The analysis presented below looks in more detail at the correlates of human capital
spending.  The amount of data is still limited with only 39 countries, and the results 
presented here are intended as purely descriptive with the emphasis on the role of 
age structure.  Our previous analysis (Lee and Mason, 2010) considered only 
combined public and private spending, but here we will analyze public and private 
spending separately.  In previous work we controlled directly for differences in 
income by measuring investment in YoLYs as in Figure 3. Here we will allow human 
capital spending to vary both with income (as measured by YoLYs or the mean labor
income of persons 30-49) and the total fertility rate (TFR).  We also extend the 
analysis to consider the potential effects of population aging, as measured by the 
child-dependency ratio and the old-age dependency ratio, on human capital 
spending. 
Specifying and interpreting the human capital equation
In what might be called the pedagogical version of Becker’s (1991) quantity-quality 
theory, a couple first decides what fraction 1-w of family income Y to devote to its 
own consumption, and next decides how to allocate the balance wY between 
quantity and quality of children. In this case, for a given level of family income, then
quality is inversely proportional to quantity. Suppose that the income share devoted
to children is the same at all levels of income. Regardless of the source of variation 
in the two, they will always lie on the line defined by H = wY/N, where N is the 
number of children and H is human capital per child, or quality. Dividing both sides 
by Y we get H/Y = w/N. Now note that Y is closely related to the YoLY. If a couple’s 
income derives from l years of effective work then Y=l*YoLY.  
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11\* MERGEFORMAT ()
This is like the relationship plotted in Figure 3, with human capital measured in YoLY
plotted against the TFR. In logarithmic form, with a coefficient =-1 on ln(N), this 
becomes: 
22\* MERGEFORMAT ()
Lee and Mason (2010) estimated = -1.05, which was not significantly different 
than -1.0, consistent with the pedagogical model and the interpretation that we are 
simply estimating the quantity-quality budget constraint. 
Now suppose that w is a function of income level, and specifically  or
. We can write the equation in log form, substituting single 
coefficients for groups of constants:
33\* MERGEFORMAT ()
The fixed w assumption corresponds to  and the assumption that quantity 
times quality is a constant equal to wY corresponds to . This is the equation we
will estimate below, separately for public and private human capital expenditures. 
There is no particular reason why  should be 1 and w should be fixed. But if  
does not equal 1, then we cannot interpret this equation as estimating the quantity-
quality budget constraint. 
For the quantity-quality model, it is really surviving children that matters rather 
than births per se, at least to the extent that variations in child mortality are largely 
outside the control of the family. In the contemporary setting, child survival is high 
enough in most countries that it probably makes little difference for the estimates 
whether we use the TFR or use a measure which reflects survival for children, such 
as the child dependency ratio (CDR). Since we will be using our estimated equation 
to backcast to the 1950s for countries that at that time had high mortality, such as 
China with an infant mortality rate of 195 per thousand in 1950-55, we will also 
estimate an equation that uses the child dependency ratio. 
Results
The results are obtained by regressing the natural log of human capital spending on
the YoLY, TFR (Table 2) or the CDR (Table 3), and a European dummy variable equal
to 1 for continental European countries.  Human capital spending is the synthetic 
cohort measure described above.  (In the simulation model presented below this is 
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represented by hki_sc.) The CDR is computed as the population 0-24 over the 
population 25 to 59, based on typical cross-over points in consumption and labor 
income in the NTA data.  The dummy variable for Europe is included to capture 
differences in public policy between social welfare states found in Europe and other 
high income countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United 
States).   NTA data are available in the local currency of each country.  These values
have been converted to US dollars using GDP purchasing power parity factors from 
World Development Indicators.  
Table 2.  Correlates of natural log of human capital spending in 39 countries, TFR 
estimates, YoLY based on GDP purchasing power parity.  
 
(1) (2) (3)
Human capital, 
public
Human capital, 
private
Human capital, 
combined
ln YoLY 1.292*** 0.900*** 1.185***
(0.0974) (0.121) (0.0473)
Europe 0.130 -1.466*** -0.136
(0.192) (0.240) (0.0934)
ln TFR -0.631** -0.765** -0.480***
(0.222) (0.277) (0.108)
Constant -1.537 1.632 -0.133
(1.012) (1.261) (0.491)
N 39 39 39
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Public, private, and combined spending on human capital increase with income.  
Public and combined spending have income elasticities significantly greater than 
unity, while private spending is insignificantly different than unity.  Given fertility or 
the child dependency ratio, human capital spending rises more rapidly than income 
across the countries in our data.
Neither public nor combined human capital spending in Europe is significantly 
different than that found in other countries.  Private spending, however, is 
substantially lower in continental European countries.  
The quantity-quality tradeoff is present in both the public and private spending 
data.  The point estimate for the private spending elasticity is somewhat higher 
than the point estimate for the public spending elasticity using either TFR or CDR, 
but the difference is not statistically significant. 
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Table 3.  Correlates of natural log of human capital spending in 39 countries, CDR 
estimates, YoLY based on GDP purchasing power parity.  
(1) (2) (3)
Human capital,
public
Human capital,
private
Human capital,
combined
ln YoLY 1.226*** 0.864*** 1.132***
(0.122) (0.156) (0.0606)
Europe 0.0535 -1.528*** -0.196
(0.204) (0.260) (0.101)
ln CDR -0.789* -0.814* -0.606***
(0.308) (0.393) (0.153)
Constant -1.450 1.329 -0.0513
(1.111) (1.417) (0.551)
N 39 39 39
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
These results are robust.  We have estimated the model using consumption deflator
with no effect of note on the results.  We have also included the old age support 
ratio in the model, but in no statistical analysis does it have a statistically significant
effect on any of the outcome measures.    
Table 4.  Correlates of natural log of education spending in 39 countries, TFR 
specification, YoLY based on GDP purchasing power parity.
(1) (2) (3)
Education, 
public
Education, 
private
Education, 
combined
ln YoLY 1.277*** 0.817*** 1.150***
(0.0986) (0.161) (0.0510)
Europe 0.144 -1.623*** -0.124
(0.195) (0.318) (0.101)
ln TFR -0.695** -1.105** -0.622***
(0.225) (0.368) (0.116)
Constant -1.526 2.408 0.106
(1.024) (1.675) (0.530)
N 39 39 39
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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We have estimated the model separately for health and education.  The results for 
education spending, reported in Tables 4 and 5, are very similar to those reported 
for combined human capital spending.  The demographic effects appear to be 
stronger for education than for general human capital.  The point estimate of the 
elasticity for private spending on education is particularly large at -1.1 for the TFR 
and −1.2 for the CDR.    
Table 5.  Correlates of natural log of education spending in 39 countries, CDR 
specification, YoLY based on GDP purchasing power parity.
(1) (2) (3)
Education,
public
Education,
private
Education,
combined
ln YoLY 1.200*** 0.758*** 1.081***
(0.124) (0.208) (0.0662)
Europe 0.0573 -1.717*** -0.202
(0.206) (0.347) (0.110)
ln CDR -0.882** -1.194* -0.789***
(0.311) (0.524) (0.167)
Constant -1.392 2.025 0.224
(1.124) (1.891) (0.602)
N 39 39 39
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
The results for health spending are reported in Tables 6 and 7.  The estimated 
income effects are, again, very similar to those found for education and for 
combined human capital spending.  Private health spending is estimated at being 
lower in Europe than elsewhere, although the coefficient is not 
Table 6.  Correlates of natural log of health spending in 39 countries, TFR 
specification, YoLY based on GDP purchasing power parity. 
(1) (2) (3)
Health, public Health, private Health, 
combined
ln YoLY 1.408*** 0.896*** 1.298***
(0.139) (0.224) (0.0939)
Europe 0.114 -0.813 -0.160
(0.274) (0.443) (0.185)
ln TFR -0.226 -0.194 -0.00330
(0.317) (0.511) (0.214)
Constant -4.837** -0.721 -3.377**
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(1.444) (2.331) (0.976)
N 39 39 39
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
statistically significant at the 5% level.  The estimated fertility and CDR elasticities 
are smaller for health than for education and they are not statistically significant. 
The estimated elasticities are about -0.2 for both public and private (-0.1 in the case
of private health in the CDR specification), but the standard errors are quite large.  
Table 7.  Correlates of natural log of health spending in 39 countries, CDR 
specification, YoLY based on GDP purchasing power parity.
(1) (2) (3)
Health, public Health, private Health,
combined
ln YoLY 1.405*** 0.919** 1.295***
(0.172) (0.277) (0.116)
Europe 0.101 -0.807 -0.162
(0.287) (0.462) (0.193)
ln CDR -0.215 -0.106 -0.0104
(0.433) (0.698) (0.292)
Constant -5.000** -1.086 -3.359**
(1.563) (2.518) (1.052)
N 39 39 39
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
In our view, the statistical analysis is consistent with two important conclusions.  
The first is that the increased reliance on public investment in human capital that 
occurs with development is related to income per se (or correlates of income).  It is 
not because public spending responds more to fertility decline than does private 
spending; it does not.  The second conclusion is that the quantity-quality tradeoff is 
both a public and a private sector phenomenon.  Becker’s model was intended to 
explain private decision-making about fertility and spending on children.  As an 
empirical matter, however, the quantity-quality tradeoff characterizes public 
spending, as well.  In contrast to our earlier results (Lee and Mason, 2010), the 
analyses with this larger set of countries and including income as a regressor yield 
estimated elasticities for human capital, education, and health in relation to fertility 
or surviving children that are significantly less than unity (in absolute value), except
for those in Table 5 for spending on education in relation to the child dependency 
ratio. The general result means that we cannot interpret these estimates as simple 
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descriptions of the multiplicative budget constraint in the quantity-quality model, 
but they provide an empirical basis for the simulation analysis presented below. 
Does fertility decline cause higher investment per child in human 
capital?
We have estimated equations that describe associations among the TFR or child 
dependency ratio, human capital investment per child, and various measures of per 
capita income, for 39 countries in a recent year. However, just because the 
equations fit the patterns of actual observed differences across countries 
reasonably well does not mean that they can also tell us what would happen if we 
exogenously changed fertility through a policy intervention such as a family 
planning program. The observed patterns arise in part from fertility decline due to 
family planning programs and in part from fertility decline induced by 
socioeconomic change including the price and availability of public education, 
changing female education and employment opportunities, declining mortality, and 
so on. The United Nations medium fertility projection surely also reflects implicit 
assumptions about all these factors, and for this reason our estimated association of
fertility, education, and income provides a reasonable basis for projecting changes 
in human capital investments per child. 
Now consider the United Nations low fertility projection. In practice this lower 
trajectory could result from differences in socioeconomic development or from 
intensified family planning program inputs or both. Socioeconomic changes could 
include intensified investment in female education as well as general increases in 
public and private human capital investment. Given this mixture of influences, the 
estimated equations might provide a reasonable basis for projecting educational 
attainment for the low fertility scenario as well. But if the United Nations low fertility
projection is interpreted as a policy target to be achieved by improved and 
expanded family planning programs then the situation is different, and requires 
further consideration. 
In an excellent review article, Miller and Babiarz (2014) discuss the causal effects of 
family planning programs on fertility and also assess the causal effects of family 
planning programs on educational attainment: “However, long-term studies of 
socio-economic outcomes suggest that family planning programs may raise 
educational attainment among women (by 1%-30%) and among children (by 5-
18%). Although socio-economic effects at the bottom end of these ranges may 
seem small, we note that they are not dissimilar in magnitude to gains associated 
with programs explicitly aiming to boost educational attainment.” (pp. 11-12). 
These results are drawn from the well-known Matlab Experiment in Bangladesh, for 
which socioeconomic outcomes have been analyzed by Joshi and Schultz (2013). 
Combining this reported outcome with causal estimates of the induced fertility 
decline in Matlab we calculate a range of causal elasticities of educational 
attainment with respect to fertility from -.73 to -1.34. Our preferred estimates, 
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reported earlier, are close to the smaller (in absolute value) of these. Our measure 
of human capital investment is quite different than grade attainment, and our 
estimates differ in other important ways as well. 
Overall, we conclude that there is great uncertainty about this matter, but that our 
estimated equations provide a reasonable basis for estimating the human capital 
investments along the United Nations low fertility trajectory as well as the medium 
one. In the simulations to be reported below, we use our own estimated equation. 
Conceptual macro framework
The conceptual foundations of the simulation model, presented in detail below, 
draws on our own previous work on the first and second dividends (Mason and Lee 
2007) and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil’s (1992) incorporation of human and physical 
capital into the neo-classical growth framework.  Consumption per capita (C/N), 
used as an indicator of welfare, is governed by a simple identity (the time index is 
suppressed): 
44\* MERGEFORMAT ()
The first dividend refers to the effect on per capita consumption of changes in 
population age structure that operates through the support ratio, L/N.  The second 
dividend refers to effects that operate through net production per worker (1-s)Y/L.   
By net production we mean the output produced per worker that is consumed 
rather than saved and invested.  The association of fertility decline with female 
labor supply, explored by Bloom, Canning et al. (2009) could also be included here, 
but we do not address it in this paper.   
Support ratio
The number of effective workers, L(t), depends on the exogenously determined 
population at each age x in year t, N(x,t), and a fixed age-profile, l(x), that captures 
age-specific variation in labor force participation, hours worked, unemployment, and
the influences of age on productivity, both positive and negative.  (Note that unlike 
our earlier analysis l(x) is based on the per capita age profile of labor income 
purged of the effects of age-specific variation in human capital.) The effective labor 
force is: 
55\* MERGEFORMAT ()
The support ratio is defined as the number of effective workers (L) per person (N).  
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Net production per worker
The second dividend operates through two channels, investment in physical capital 
and in human capital.  The contributions to output (Y) of both forms of capital are 
captured using the MRW production function: 
66\* MERGEFORMAT ()
Where K is capital, H is human capital, and A is the level of labor-augmenting 
technology.  The rate of technological growth is exogenous and constant: 
77\* MERGEFORMAT ()
Output per worker is given by: 
88\* MERGEFORMAT ()
Or equivalently by: 
99\* MERGEFORMAT ()
where k is the capital-output ratio (K/Y) and h is the human capital-output ratio 
(H/Y).  
Effective labor is exogenously determined (see equation Error: Reference source not
found). 
The relationship between saving and the capital-output ratio is given by: 
1010\* MERGEFORMAT ()
where ,  is investment in physical capital as a share of GDP, g is the rate 
of growth of GDP, and is the constant capital depreciation rate, and time is 
suppressed for notational simplicity.  
A similar expression applies to spending on human capital and the human capital-
output ratio: 
1111\* MERGEFORMAT ()
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where ,  is investment in human capital as a share of GDP, g is the rate 
of growth of GDP, and is the human capital depreciation rate.
In steady state, we have and  the rate of growth of technological 
progress plus the rate of growth of the effective labor force or, equivalently, the 
rate of growth of the population.  In equilibrium, we have: 
1212\* MERGEFORMAT ()
1313\* MERGEFORMAT ()
Equations Error: Reference source not found and Error: Reference source not found 
are social budget constraints that govern the tradeoff between saving and capital.  
At a lower population growth rate, n, the saving rate necessary to maintain a given 
capital-output ratio is lower.  The same is true for human capital.  The social budget 
constraints arise purely from growth dynamics and involve no assumptions about 
behavior or policy.  
Steady state results
Steady state results are easily obtained for two polar cases that differ in their 
assumptions about “behavior”.  
Solow case
In the Solow case, saving rates are exogenous.  The equilibrium capital-output and 
human capital-output ratios are given by: 
1414\* MERGEFORMAT ()
1515\* MERGEFORMAT ()
Net production per worker, production excluding investment, is given by:  
1616\* 
MERGEFORMAT ()
From inspection a decrease in the population growth rate leads to higher net 
production per worker.  Given saving rates, an decrease in the population growth 
rate leads to capital deepening and human capital deepening, here measured by 
capital-output and human capital-output ratios.  This is the standard Solow result as
extended to include human capital in Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) (MRW).  To 
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summarize:  if saving rates are exogenous, a decline in the population growth rate 
leads to a second dividend in the long run.  
Fixed capital-output case
In this case the capital-output and human capital-output ratios are exogenous while 
the saving rates are endogenous (Lee, Mason et al. 2014).  Net production per 
worker in equilibrium is given by: 
1717\* 
MERGEFORMAT ()
Again by inspection, we see that a decrease in population growth leads to an 
increase in net production, with the effect operating through the saving rates for 
physical and human capital.  Slower population growth yields a long-run second 
dividend in this case, as well.  
Human capital dynamics
The MRW formulation provides an intuitive and useful approach by treating human 
and physical capital dynamics in parallel fashion.  Important features of human 
capital dynamics are captured in more recent studies that recognize that human 
capital is embodied (Ashraf al. 2013 or Crespo Cuaresma et al. 2014).  Human 
capital only influences GDP, as we measure it, only when those who are the 
recipients of human capital spending are employed.  This has implications for 
human capital saving and depreciation.  First, the process of creating human capital
is characterized by a substantial lag.  Years may pass between the time children 
receive spending on health or education and they become workers.  In the 
formulation presented above (equations (4) or (16), for example) human capital 
saving is measured as current spending on the education and health of children.  In 
equation (11) human capital saving occurs when the recipient of human capital 
becomes of member of the workforce.  Of course, some will never enter the labor 
force.  Second, human capital depreciates as workers leave the workforce.  One 
could calculate a depreciation rate based on the useful life of that human capital as 
is often done for traditional forms of capital.  Or one can calculate depreciation 
based on simulated withdrawal from the labor force with depreciation endogenous 
depending on population age structure as it influences the share of the workforce at
the end of its “useful life”.  The detailed simulation model presented below reflects 
the more complex and interesting dynamics that arise when we recognize the 
embodied nature of human capital.  
Simulation model
Key elements of the simulation model are governed by the conceptual framework 
described above.  Per capita consumption is determined by the support ratio (the 
first dividend) and net production (the second dividend) as shown in equation 4.  
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The support ratio is the ratio of the effective labor force to population.  The effective
labor force, as defined by equation 5, is the number of workers adjusted to 
incorporate age variation in labor force participation, unemployment, hours worked,
and experience on productivity.  In this formulation, the effective labor force does 
not reflect the influence of human capital investment, which is included in our 
measure of human capital.   See the appendix for a detailed explanation of the 
method.
Net production is the portion of output that is consumed rather than saved.  Saving 
is broadly defined to include both conventional saving as defined in national 
accounts, for example, and human capital spending.  Output is based on the MRW 
production function with three factors of production, capital, human capital, and 
labor (equation 6).  The behavioral mechanisms that determine saving and 
Investment in physical capital are of secondary interest and we assume that the 
capital-output ratio is fixed. Saving, or equivalently investment, in physical capital is
given by:  
1818\* MERGEFORMAT ()
where k is exogenous and time-invariant.  We rely on this case because we believe 
it is broadly consistent with two important empirical features of saving and capital.  
The first is that the capital-output ratio has been relatively constant over extended 
periods of time in many countries (see references in Lee, Mason et al. (2014)) and 
certainly more so than the saving rate.  The second is the strong positive correlation
between the saving rate and the rate of GDP growth, known as the rate of growth 
effect, found in many studies (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954; Mason 1987; Mason 
1988).  We note, however, that there is some evidence that capital-output ratios 
have increased recently in high-income countries (Piketty 2014).  
Human capital saving is simulated using regression results reported above to 
project synthetic cohort values (hki_sc(t)).  Synthetic cohort values of human capital
investment are determined by the child dependency ratio and the average of the 
per capita labor income (yl(x,t)) of adults age 30-49, YoLY(t):   
1919\* 
MERGEFORMAT ()
We then map from synthetic cohort values to human capital investment by single 
year of age x using model age-profiles constructed from NTA data (see appendix).  
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Human capital is endogenous, cohort specific, and based on public and private 
spending on health and education during the childhood ages (3-26 for education 
and 0-17 for health). Human capita spending contributes to the production of 
output, however, only to the extent that those who possess it are employed.  This 
implies a considerable lag between the time at which human capital investment is 
made and human capital is realized.  Moreover, human capital declines in value as 
workers withdraw from the labor force, experience unemployment, or reduce their 
hours.  For fully employed workers, human capital may appreciate in value as 
workers gain experience and depreciate in value as workers are subject to decline 
in their cognitive abilities and other productivity-impairing effects of aging.  These 
effects are incorporated into the analysis using the age-profile of productivity, l(x).  
The method for calculating human capital differs from the approach taken in MRW.  
The human capital per person of age x in year t, h(x,t), is equal to the cumulative 
investment in human capital per person, and the effectiveness with which those at 
that age are engaged in GDP-producing activities:  
2020\* MERGEFORMAT 
()
Total human capital in period t is calculated by multiplying by the population of 
each age and summing across age.  Dividing by total output yields the human 
capital intensity of the economy, h(t):  
2121\* MERGEFORMAT ()
Estimating h(x,t) requires historical estimates of age-specific human capital 
spending.  These are constructed using methods reported in the appendix.  
Model parameters and initial conditions
The purpose of these simulations is to assess the economic implications of a wide 
range of possible demographic outcomes as a poor country experiences its fertility 
transition.  The analysis is not intended to provide forecasts or projections for any 
particular country.  The economic model that we employ is generic and the model 
parameters (Table 8) and the initial conditions (Table 9) are not based on any 
particular country.  
Table 8. Model parameters
Variable Value Notes
Age-profile of effective labor See appendix
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(l(x))
Elasticity of output with respect 
to capital and human capital 
1/3, 1/3 Estimates from Mankiw, 
Romer, and Weil (MRW).
Rate of technological progress (
)
0.02 Standard assumption.
Depreciation rate, capital ( ) 0.05 Standard, e.g., MRW.
Depreciation rate, human capital
( )
Endogenous See text
Human capital investment 
parameters 
( )
See estimates in 
Table 3.  
Public and private human 
capital spending 
computed separately and 
then combined.
We consider a country that has not yet begun its demographic transition and is very
poor (Table 9).  Demographic conditions are based on UN estimates for Nigeria in 
1950, which had a total fertility rate of 6.4 births per woman.  The support ratio was
0.34 effective workers per person and the child dependency ratio (the number 
under 25 to those 25-59) was 1.8.  The population growth rate was moderately high 
at 1.5% because death rates were quite high in 1950.  
Income per effective worker is set to $250 and, based on the model, per capita 
income is $129 and per capita consumption just over $100.  The capital-output ratio
is fixed at 2, by assumption, and hence capital per worker is $500.  The initial 
human capital-output ratio and human capital per worker, constructed using 
historical data, are equal to 0.97 and $364, respectively.  The initial investment and 
human capital investment rates are 14% and 7.9% of total output, respectively, but 
investment rates net of depreciation are much smaller at 4% and 0.9%, 
respectively.    
Table 9. Initial conditions, poor, pre-transition country, 1950  
Total fertility rate 6.4 Support ratio 0.34
Population growth rate
(%) 1.5 Child dependency ratio 1.8
Income per effective 
worker
$25
0 Per capita consumption
  
$10
1
Capital-output ratio 2.0 Human capital-output ratio 0.97
Capital per effective 
worker
$50
0
Human capital per effective 
worker
 
$36
4
Investment rate 0.140
Human capital investment 
rate
0.07
9
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From 1950 to 2010, all scenarios are based on population and fertility estimates for 
Nigeria.  Thereafter, we use three demographic scenarios to simulate the economy 
and to assess the first and second demographic dividends.  The medium scenario 
uses the medium fertility scenario projection for Nigeria from World Population 
Prospects 2012 (United Nations Population Division 2013).  This scenario anticipates
a steady but gradual decline in fertility with replacement fertility reached near the 
end of this century.  The low fertility scenario, also based on the UN projections, 
assumes that fertility will be lower by one-half child.  Under these conditions 
replacement fertility would be realized around 2075.  The third scenario is based on 
radical fertility decline.  This scenario was constructed assuming fertility decline as 
rapid as experienced by China during its fertility transition.  Under this scenario, the
total fertility rate drops from 6 births per woman in 2010-15 to replacement in only 
twenty-five years.  The TFR reaches a low of about 1.5 births per woman in 2045.  
Thereafter, the TFR rises gradually to reach 
Figure 4.  Total fertility rate, 1950-2100, under three fertility scenarios.  
1.8 births per woman toward the end of the simulation (Figure 4).  Mortality and 
migration assumptions are the same in all three scenarios.
Fertility decline leads to an immediate decline in the child dependency ratio (CDR) 
and an immediate increase in the support ratio as shown in Figure 5.  From the pre-
transition peak of over 2 child dependents per prime-age adult, the CDR drops in 
2050  to 1.5 or 1.35 for the medium and low fertility scenarios to a very low 0.75 for
the radical decline scenario.  The support ratio rises from a low of 0.31 effective 
workers per person in 2010 to 0.37, .40, and .54 for the three scenarios.   The rise in
the support ratio leads to the first demographic dividend presented below. 
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Figure 5.  Child dependency ratio (left) and support ratio (right), three fertility 
scenarios.  The child dependency ratio (CDR) is defined as the population under 25 
relative to the population 25-59.  For the definition of the support ratio see the text. 
Pre-transition and the medium fertility scenario
We begin by considering both the prolonged period of high fertility from 1950 to 
2010 followed by the medium scenario fertility transition.  The simulated rates of 
growth of population, income, per capita income, and per capita consumption are 
reported in Table 10.   High birth rates combined with lower death rates lead to 
population growth rates exceeding 2.5 percent per year for 1975 -2050.  Population 
growth drops slowly thereafter reaching about 1 percent per year for 2075-2100.  
Table 10. Annual growth rates (percent), poor, slow
transition
Per
capita
income
Per capita
consumptio
n 
Populati
on
Inco
me
1950-
1975 2.1 3.3 1.2 1.0
1975-
2000 2.7 3.8 1.1 1.1
2000-
2025 2.7 4.4 1.6 1.6
2025-
2050 2.5 4.9 2.4 2.4
2050-
2075 1.8 4.9 3.0 3.1
2075-
2100 1.1 4.2 3.0 3.2
Rapid population growth leads to rapid growth in the effective labor force and total 
output.  Per capita income and per capita consumption grow quite slowly during the
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pre-fertility transition period – only about one percent per year.  Growth is more 
rapid once the fertility transition begins.  The growth rates of per capita income and
per capita consumption rise steadily until they reach 3 percent per year, triple the 
earlier rate, during the second half of the Twenty-first Century.  
Higher growth is realized because of changes in the growth rate of the support ratio
(L/N) and the growth rate of net production ((1-s)Y/L) as shown in Figure 6.  Prior to 
the fertility transition the support ratio was a moderate drag on economic growth.  
For the entire 2000-25 period, growth in the support ratio added about 0.1% per 
year to growth in per capita consumption.  Growth in the support ratio only 
contributes in a meaningful way to economic growth during the final three twenty-
five year period – adding roughly 0.5 percentage points to economic growth.  In 
2025-50 and 2050-75, growth in the support ratio explains about one-quarter of the 
economic growth.  The support ratio is declining in importance by the end of the 
simulation, for the last twenty-five year period, growth in the support ratio explains 
only 17 percent of overall economic growth.  
Figure 6.  Growth in per capita consumption and its sources:  growth in the support 
ratio (L/N) and growth in net production per worker ((1-s)Y/L).  Scenario:  Poor, high 
fertility country with moderate fertility decline beginning in 2010.  File: 
Simulations.Nigeria.CDR.xlsx/Econ summary
The growth in net production is very moderate at little more than one percent per 
year in the early part of the simulation.  It rises steadily, however, and by the latter 
part of the simulation is growing at roughly 2.5 percent per year.  The rise in the 
27
growth rate of net production is primarily responsible for the higher rate of 
economic growth that accompanies the transition to lower fertility.  
Growth in net production is due to a variety of factors – technological change, 
changes in the saving rates, and the accumulation of physical and human capital 
that occurs throughout the simulation period.  The trends in capital and human 
capital per worker are quite different than the trends in capital and human capital 
intensity (K/Y and H/Y).  By assumption, the capital-output ratio (K/Y) is constant at 
2.0 throughout the simulation as shown in Figure 7.  Capital grows at the same rate 
as output, but output grows more rapidly than the effective labor force L.  As a 
consequence, we see a very substantial increase in capital per worker.  Between 
1950 and 2000, capital per worker almost doubles – increasing from $750 to $1480.
During the next 50 years, capital per worker more than doubles reaching $3300.  
During the final 50 years, capital per worker more than triples passing $10,000 per 
worker.  
Figure 7. Trends in capital and human capital, 1950 to 2100.  Scenario:  Poor, high 
fertility country with moderate fertility decline beginning in 2010.  File: 
Simulations.Nigeria.CDR.xlsx
The human capital trend is much less favorable under this scenario.  The human 
capital–output ratio is about 1 in 1950, but it declines to 0.70 in 2000 and less than 
0.60 in 2050.  It recovers slightly but by 2100 is still only 0.69 – the level of 2000.  
Human capital per worker grows but much more gradually than physical capital.  
Human capital increases from $360 in 1950 to $511 in 2000, $970 in 2050, and 
$3600 in 2100.  Over the entire 150 year period, human capital increases by 10-fold
as compared with 14-fold increase in physical capital per worker.  
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Fertility decline and the first and second dividends
The growth in per capita consumption under the medium fertility scenario is a 
consequence of demographic forces and technological progress, which have both 
direct and indirect effects through capital and human capital accumulation.  The 
effects of demography on economic growth are in themselves complex.  Changes in
age structure are the consequence of current and historical trends in fertility and 
mortality.  Consequently, many of the economic effects of changing age structure 
are built into current conditions.  Policies, if effective, can influence fertility, 
mortality, or immigration and indirectly population age structure in a slow and 
evolving way.  
Our interest here is to assess the magnitude and timing of the first and second 
dividend that occur because of fertility decline, per se.  This question can be 
answered by comparing the simulation results from each of our scenarios to a 
counterfactual – the simulated performance of the economy in the absence of 
fertility decline.  For this purpose, we rely on the UN population projection using the 
constant fertility scenario.  In all other respects the assumptions and initial 
conditions are identical to those employed for the medium scenario, the low fertility
scenario, and the radical fertility scenario. 
We begin with the bottom line; each of the fertility decline scenarios leads to a 
substantial increase in per capita consumption growth as compared with the no 
fertility decline scenario (Figure 8).  For the medium and low fertility scenarios, the 
gains are moderate between 2010 and 2040 averaging 0.4 and 0.6 percentage 
points of higher annual growth respectively.   After 2040 the gains are very large 
with the medium fertility scenario adding between 1.4 and 1.5 percentage points to 
growth in per capita consumption and the low fertility scenario adding between 1.6 
and 1.7 percentage points to economic growth.  The radical fertility decline scenario
produces a much more immediate impact with growth higher by 1.4 percentage 
points between 2010 and 2040 and an even larger impact – 2.3 percentage points 
over the following three decades.   
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Figure 8.  Effect of fertility decline on the annual rate of growth of per capita 
consumption, 2010-2040, 2040-2070, and 2070-2100; three fertility decline 
scenarios.  File: DD&GJ_AGEBTA_2015_lite version.pptx
The cumulative effect of the demographic dividends can be seen in Figure 9 which 
shows the percentage increase in per capita consumption as compared with the 
counterfactual – no fertility decline.  By 2040, per capita consumption would be 
higher by 12 percent given the medium fertility scenario, 22 percent given the low 
fertility scenario, and 53 percent given the radical fertility decline scenario.  The 
cumulative effects grow ever larger so that by 2070 per capita consumption is 
higher by 68%, 96%, or 217% for the medium, low, and radical fertility scenarios, 
respectively.   By the end of the simulation, fertility decline results in per capita 
consumption higher by between 150% and 350% depending on the scenario. 
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Figure 9.  Percentage effect on per capita consumption of demographic dividends, 
2010-2100; three fertility scenarios.  File: DD&GJ_AGEBTA_2015_lite version.pptx
What accounts for these very substantial gains?  We start by separating the 
additional growth in per capita consumption into the first and second demographic 
dividend shown in Figure 10.  Given the medium and low fertility scenario, the first 
dividend persists through the remainder of the 21st Century contributing between 
0.35 and 0.9 percentage points to growth in per capita consumption.  In both 
scenarios the first dividend’s largest effect is in the second thirty year period.  The 
low fertility scenario produces moderately higher first dividends throughout the 
simulation.  The radical fertility scenario produces a first dividend that comes earlier
with an impact that is greater but more concentrated.  In 2010-2040, the first 
dividend adds 1.3 percentage points of additional growth and it remains very strong
for the 2040-2070 period at 0.85 additional percentage points of growth.  Then, the 
first dividend ends depressing growth by 0.16 percentage points per year between 
2070 and 2100.  
In all scenarios the second dividend effects are delayed – important only after 2040.
They are substantial in all scenarios adding at least 0.5 percentage points to 
economic growth and, in some cases, much more.  The low fertility scenario adds a 
full percentage point to economic growth for the 2070-2100 period while the radical
fertility decline scenarios adds 1.4 percentage points of growth in both the 2040-70 
and 2070-2100 periods. 
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Figure 10.  First dividend (upper panel) and second dividend (lower panel) for three 
fertility scenarios.  First dividend is the effect of fertility decline on growth in the 
support ratio.  Second dividend is the effect of fertility decline on growth in net 
production per worker. File: DD&GJ_AGEBTA_2015_lite version.pptx
What caused the second dividend? 
The second dividend can be traced to three sources:  a change in the consumption 
or saving rate, capital deepening and human capital deepening.  Growth of net 
production can be calculated by taking the ln and differentiating with respect to t:    
2222\* MERGEFORMAT ()
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The same calculation can be applied to the counterfactual scenario (no fertility 
decline).  Taking the difference yields the additional growth in net production over 
the counterfactual scenario as consisting of three terms.  Using a delta to represent 
the difference between a scenario and a counterfactual we have: 
2323\* 
MERGEFORMAT ()
The second dividend is due to changes in the rates of growth of three factors –the 
consumption rate (1-s), capital per effective worker, and human capital per effective
worker.  
The results are reported in Figure 11 for two periods 2010-2040 and 2040-2070.  
The results for 2070-2100 are very similar to those for 2040-2070.  The relative 
importance of the second dividend channels differs little across the scenarios.  For 
the initial thirty year period, the main contributor to the second dividend was capital
deepening with human capital playing a secondary role.  Keep in mind, however, 
that the second dividend is relatively modest during this period.  The second 
dividend plays a much more important role after 2040 and the human capital 
channel is very important  
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Figure 11.  Share of second dividend contributed by an increase in its three 
components:  consumption rate, capital, and human capital; three fertility 
scenarios.  Upper panel reports results for 2010-2040 and lower panel is for 2040-
2070. File: DD&GJ_AGEBTA_2015_lite version.pptx
explaining almost two-thirds of the second dividend.  Capital deepening explained 
almost one-third of the second dividend.  Changes in the saving rate played a small 
role in the second dividend.  During the first thirty-year period, increases in the 
saving rate depressed consumption per effective worker.  Later, saving rates 
declined contributing between 3 and 8 percent of the second dividend. 
Human capital investment revisited
Human capital investment is a broad, comprehensive measure of resources devoted
to the development of children and youth.  There are many important questions 
about the relative contribution to development of public versus private spending on 
health and human capital, and the ways such spending affects economic inequality 
in subsequent generations. Surely spending at some ages is more important than 
spending at others.  Spending  on neonatal care or primary education may matter 
more than spending on child health or tertiary education, for example.  Another 
important issue to explore is the potential complementarity between investment in 
health and education.  These are just some of the important issues that could be 
analyzed in the future given sufficient NTA data, but not at the present.  
A simpler and instructive exercise is to identify the changing importance of human 
capital investment components as a high fertility country experiences demographic 
change.  In Table 11, we report the simulated level and composition of human 
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capital investment expressed in YoLYs for the low fertility scenario.  Inevitably they 
conform to the cross-sectional patterns that we have discussed above.  
Over the course of the simulation, average human capital investment per child is 
projected to increase very substantially.  In 2010, the total investment per child was
about 1.5 YoLYs.  The investment rises gradually during the first thirty years  
reaching only 1.8 YoLYs by 2040, but accelerates thereafter reaching 2.7 YoLYs by 
2070 and almost 4 by 2100 – a level on par with today’s advanced economies.  
Income has little effect on education, expressed in YoLYs, although a YoLY is worth 
far more in real terms in 2100 than in 2010.  The change in human capital is a 
consequence of the quantity-quality tradeoff.  The causal connections are 
impossible to discern, but clearly the development process is marked by a strong 
shift towards few children with high investment per child. 
An important result is the central role of the public sector in the quantity-quality 
transition.  In 2010, about 38% of spending on human capital investment was public
and 62% private.  The public share rises steadily over the simulation exceeding half 
of the total by 2100.  All of that gain is due to public education spending.  Public 
health investment remains at about 5% of the total throughout the simulation.  
Private health spending drops substantially as a share of the total between 2010 
and 2100.  In YolYs, private spending on health is flat over the entire simulation.  
Private education as a share of the total drops significantly over the simulation, 
particularly during the middle thirty year period.   Private education spending per 
child in YoLYs is rising over the entire simulation, but substantially more slowly than
public sector spending.  
Table 11. Human capital spending and composition, synthetic cohort values, 
low fertility scenario. 
 
Human
capital
spending
(YoLY)
Composition of human capital spending (%)
Public
education
Private
education
Public
health
Private
health
201
0 1.49 32.8 49.4 5.1 12.7
204
0 1.82 36.6 47.8 5.4 10.2
207
0 2.72 41.4 46.7 5.1 6.8
210
0 3.94 47.2 42.9 5.3 4.6
The public-private split has many important implications to be explored.  It shows 
clearly how important public policy is to realizing the second demographic dividend.
The economic gains identified here depend directly on the public sector directing 
greater resources into human capital investment.  The results have potentially 
interesting implications for inequality to the extent that public investment in 
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education and health is broadly distributed across all socio-economic strata, 
whereas private spending has a steep socioeconomic gradient. 
Comparison to a similar study
An excellent paper by Ashraf, Weil and Wilde (2013, henceforth AWW) simulates the
effects of fertility decline on per capita income in Nigeria, contrasting the outcomes 
for the United Nations medium and low scenarios. Our conceptual approach is very 
similar to theirs, but the emphasis and implementation are somewhat different. In 
our analysis, we compare outcomes to a baseline scenario in which no fertility 
decline occurs whereas they are comparing the low and medium scenarios with 
TFRs that differ by one-half child.  Their outcome variable of interest is income per 
capita, while ours is consumption per capita, where human capital expenditures are 
treated as a form of saving and excluded from consumption. In AWW consumption 
is a constant share of income, while in our paper when fertility declines, 
consumption rises as a share of income since less needs to be invested to keep the 
capital-income ratio constant, but at the same time expenditures on human capital 
rise, reducing consumption as a share of income. AWW relies on microeconomic 
estimates in the literature for their parameter values in the simulation while we use 
macroeconomic data from NTA to estimate cross-national relationships and for the 
age profiles of labor income and consumption that we use to calculate changing 
dependency. 
AWW discusses many potential economic effects of fertility decline, but from among
all those actually included in their simulation, our analysis incorporates all but two. 
The first is their inclusion of land as a factor of production and the second is 
increasing female labor force participation in response to declining fertility. In their 
evaluation of results both these factors play minor roles. Our analysis includes per 
capita income growth as a driver of increased human capital investment per child in
addition to declining fertility, which intensifies all the other included effects. In 
addition to these differences, there are also differences in functional form. 
The base year is 2010 for both studies, and it is possible to compare the two sets of 
results after 20 and 50 years, that is for 2030 and 2060. We find that the 
differences between outcomes for the medium and low fertility trajectories are 
small. In 2030 AWW find a relative gain in per capita income for low fertility of 5.6% 
while we find a relative gain of 4.8%. By 2060 this is 11.9% versus 12.7%. If we 
instead compare the differences for consumption rather than income, in 2030 this is
still 5.6% for AWW versus 4.7% for us, and in 2060 11.9% versus 13.4%. The close 
agreement of these results despite the differences in data, model specification, and 
parameter estimates, is very encouraging and lends credence to both studies. 
There are similarities and differences between the results with respect to the 
channels of economic growth.  An important similarity is that the first dividend 
(dependency effect in AWW) is particularly important in the early part of simulations
while second dividend effects become much more important in the later part of the 
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simulations.  The two models differ greatly in that our assessment of the importance
of the human capital channel is much greater.  This may be due in part to difference
specifications of the capital sector, fixed saving in their model versus fixed capital 
output in our model, and partly due to feedback effects in our model that intensify 
the contribution of human capital to economic growth.   Perhaps most important is 
that the AWW analysis is intended to quantify the effect of an exogenous change in 
fertility through human capital on development.   Our assessment of the importance
of human capital includes the full effects irrespective of the drivers that are leading 
to lower fertility and high human capital investment. 
Conclusion
Low income countries are poor, in part, because per child investment in human 
capital is so low.  This state of affairs is to an extent unavoidable because the 
resources available for any purpose are quite limited.  But the constraints facing 
families are much greater when they must provide for many children.  Low human 
capital spending per child is a manifestation of the quantity-quality tradeoff 
postulated by Becker and confirmed by many studies including our own.  Although 
developed with the decision-making of families in mind, the quantity-quality 
tradeoff is salient for public investment in human capital, as well.  
The deep connections between the number of children and investment per child 
have important implications for understanding how countries achieve economic 
development.  The demographic transition is accompanied by a human capital 
transition with fundamental shifts in the share of the population in the working ages
and the skills and productivity of those workers.  Moreover, changing demography 
influences capital accumulation and the productivity of workers beyond the 
influences of changes in human capital.  
Building on the MRW growth model to incorporate the effects of capital, human 
capital, and labor, we show that the changes in age structure and human capital 
investment over the demographic transition have substantial and lasting effects on 
standards of living.  The first dividend, the growth in the relative size of the 
workforce, provides an important, but temporary, boost to economic growth.  The 
second dividend, capturing the effects of changing investment in human and 
physical capital, is substantial and long-lasting.  Development depends on many 
factors, but demographic change and the quantity-quality tradeoff figure 
prominently by our assessment.
These conclusions must be tempered, however, by many qualifications and 
reservations.  One of the most important issues is to improve our measurement of 
human capital and our understanding of its impact on economic growth.  Our 
measure of human capital is a cost measure – the amount invested in health and 
education of children and youth.  The connections between investment and 
outcome measures such as educational attainment or cognitive development are 
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not understood.  Moreover, our measure of cost could be improved by including the 
opportunity cost of students and the value of non-market inputs to human capital, 
such as the time of parents and grandparents.   
The analysis presented here does not identify particular causal pathways.  In 
particular, we do not think that the decline in fertility is necessarily the cause of 
greater human capital investment.  Fertility decline and rising human capital 
investment are mutually reinforcing, but both are influenced by a host of forces 
including policy.
Appendix
Model schedules of human capital investment
Model profiles are used to calculate spending on human capital by single year of 
age based on synthetic cohort values of human capital spending (equation Error: 
Reference source not found) from the regression model.  Model profiles are 
constructed using the normalized values of human capital investment by age.  The 
values are normalized by dividing per capita human capital investment at each age 
by the labor income of persons 30-49 (YoLY).  The profiles have been constructed 
separately for public human capital investment (Figure A.1) and private human 
capital investment (Figure A.2) using NTA data for 39 countries.  We have sorted the
countries into four groups based on the synthetic cohort values, three groups 
consisting of ten countries and one group consisting of nine countries with the 
highest synthetic cohort value. 
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Figure A.1.  Normalized public human capital spending by age for four country 
groups classified by public synthetic cohort public spending on human capital 
expressed in YoLYs.  Source: Calculated by authors.  File:  nta data.xls
Values are projected (forward and backward) by linearly interpolating using the 
synthetic cohort values.  For values below the minimum hki_sc value, the “model” 
profile for the lowest value is scaled to match the observed hki_sc value.  Likewise, 
high profiles are obtained by rescaling the highest age profile.
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Figure A.2.  Normalized private human capital spending by age for four country 
groups classified by private synthetic cohort public spending on human capital 
expressed in YoLYs.  Source: Calculated by authors.  File:  nta data.xls
One might expect to see spending increasingly concentrated at older ages (tertiary 
levels) in countries with high human capital spending.  We don’t find that to be the 
case.  There are very substantial increases at young ages – pre-school and early 
elementary school ages.  The mean age of human capital investment drops from 
13.7 for the lowest spending countries to 12.4 for the highest spending countries.  
Public investment mean ages drop from 13.0 years to 12.5 for the highest spending 
countries.  For private human capital investment, the mean age drops from 14.0 for 
countries with very low HK spending to a mean age of 12.8 for countries with the 
highest human capital spending.  
Estimating labor supply (l(x))
Labor supply is estimated for the baseline year for each country using the age 
profile of labor income and an estimate of the cumulative human capital investment
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for persons at each age in the profile year.  Labor income by age consists of the 
return to human capital and the return to “raw labor”.  It follows directly from the 
MRW production function that the labor income is equal to: 
2424\* 
MERGEFORMAT ()
Where is total income accruing to human capital and is total income 
accruing to raw labor.  Dividing both sides by total human capital and labor income 
combined and noting that the share of capital income is yields: 
2525\* 
MERGEFORMAT ()
Substituting the elasticity estimates of 1/3 for each factor and substituting for H and
L gives: 
2626\* 
MERGEFORMAT ()
NTA estimates are employed for the age profile of total labor income, the left-hand-
side, population estimates by age are available from the UN, cumulative investment
in human capital is constructed using methods described immediately below, 
leaving l(x) to be estimated.  We estimate the l(x) values for single years of age 
from 15 to 80 giving us 65 unknowns with 65 equations.  The system is solved using
non-linear estimation routines in Stata.  (Note that the system is exactly identified 
and the non-linear routines can be used in Stata although the standard errors are 
meaningless.)  
Constructing historical estimates of cumulative human capital 
investment
The approach to constructing historical estimates consists of four steps.  First, we 
predict synthetic cohort estimates of human capital investment from 1949 to 2010. 
Second, we use synthetic cohort estimates and model profiles of age specific 
human capital investment to construct estimates of human capital investment 
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(public and private) by age from 1950 to 2010.  Third, we construct cumulative 
human capital investment by age in 1949 assuming that investment by age prior to 
1949 was less by 1 percent per year.  Fourth, given the cumulative spending in 
1949 by age and subsequent annual spending we can construct cumulative human 
capital investment at each age from 1950 to 2010.  
We used three approaches to backcasting the synthetic cohort estimates for 1950 
to 2010:  (1) the regression model based on YoLY(t) and CDR(t);  (2) the regression 
model based on YoLY(t) and TFR(t); and a regression model based on Barro-Lee (BL)
estimates of average years of schooling for those 20-24 years of age.  
Historical estimates for YoLY were constructed from real per capita GNP data from
Maddison (2001).  We multiplied by population, multiplied by two-thirds to obtain an
estimate of total labor income, and divided by the effective labor force.  The CDR 
and TFR are based on World Population Prospect estimates (United Nations 
Population Division 2013).  
The Barro-Lee based estimates were constructed by regressing ln hki_sc from NTA 
on average years of schooling for those 20-24 from BL (Barro and Lee 2010).  Time 
series data from BL was used to backcast at five year interval.  An annual series 
was obtained through linear interpolation.  
Human capital synthetic cohort values for 1950 to 2010 for the three approaches 
are compared for Nigeria and China in Figure A.3.  There are important differences 
among the series.  In Nigeria, the BL-based estimates rise between 1950 and 2010, 
but they do not for the TFR- or CDR-based series.  We see a gradual decline for the 
CDR-based series.  For China, the TFR-based series rises most steeply while the BL-
based system rises more gradually.  In both Nigeria and China, the CDR series is 
qualitatively different in that it hki_sc declines during the 1950s and 1960s as 
declining infant and child mortality led to a higher child dependency ratio that 
pushed human capital investment down relatively to labor income.  
Figure A.3.  Predicted values of synthetic cohort human capital investment, Nigeria 
(left) and China (right), 1950-2010.  Three methods are employed based 
respectively on the child dependency ratio (CDR), the total fertility rate (TFR), and 
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Barro-Lee (BL) estimates of educational attainment for persons 20-24.  See text for 
more information.  Source:  Constructed by authors.  
Estimates of the effective supply of labor, l(x), for Nigeria and China based on the 
three historical estimates of human capital investment differ are presented in Figure
A.4.  The estimated l(x) profiles are very similar to one another.  In the Nigeria case,
for TFR and CDR estimates educational attainment varies little by age and hence 
almost all of the variation in labor income is due to variation in the effective labor 
supply, l(x).  In China, younger adults are much more educated than older adults 
and, hence, the effective labor curve for China is lower than the age profile of labor 
income at young ages and higher at older ages.  As a result, effective labor 
controlling for human capital differences increases more slowly, peaks later, and is 
higher at older ages.  
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Figure A.4. Per capita labor income by age and predicted effective labor by age 
(l(x)), Nigeria 2004 and China, 2002.  All profiles have been normalized by dividing 
by the average value of those 30-49.  Estimates of l(x) are based on alternative 
estimates of human capital investment based on historical data using TFR and YoLY,
CDR and YoLY, or Barro-Lee estimates of educational attainment of those 20-24 
years old.  TFR estimate is indistinguishable from the Barro-Lee estimate in the 
China graph. 
Human capital data
Table A.1.  Human capital spending by country, recent 
year.  All values are synthetic cohort estimates and 
expressed in YoLYs, the average labor income of persons
30-49.  Education is the sum of age-specific values for 
ages 3 to 26 and health is the sum of age-specific value 
for ages 0 to 17.  Source:  www.ntaccounts.org.
Public Private
 
Educatio
n
Healt
h  
Educatio
n
Healt
h
Argentina 1.58 0.71 0.51 0.47
Australia 2.24 0.46 0.99 0.11
Austria 3.35 0.40 0.16 0.07
Brazil 1.65 0.53 0.72 0.10
Cambodia 0.63 0.09 1.05 0.28
Canada 3.62 0.54 0.36 0.17
Chile 1.55 0.43 1.06 0.13
China 1.38 0.19 1.43 0.23
Colombia 2.31 0.54 1.34 0.27
Costa Rica 1.99 0.53 0.60 0.12
Ethiopia 0.27 0.12 0.90 0.03
Finland 2.97 0.47 0.04 0.14
France 3.15 0.44 0.21 0.06
Germany 2.31 0.59 0.28 0.09
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Ghana 1.16 0.23 0.89 0.08
Hungary 3.30 0.45 0.28 0.06
India 0.82 0.25 0.53 0.15
Indonesia 1.24 0.13 0.75 0.09
Italy 3.88 0.80 0.38 0.09
Jamaica 1.53 0.17 1.70 0.10
Japan 3.46 0.42 1.22 0.19
Kenya 0.87 0.10 0.12 0.22
Mexico 2.10 0.23 0.94 0.07
Mozambique 1.21 0.16 0.12 0.08
Nigeria 0.17 0.04 1.04 0.87
Peru 1.42 0.52 1.09 0.30
Philippines 0.96 0.14 1.08 0.16
Senegal 0.54 0.11 0.28 0.18
Slovenia 4.09 0.50 0.41 0.04
South Africa 1.71 0.25 0.59 0.31
South Korea 1.76 0.26 2.14 0.12
Spain 2.87 0.46 0.53 0.08
Sweden 4.84 1.02 0.14 0.03
Taiwan 1.66 0.44 2.79 0.25
Thailand 2.35 0.16 0.35 0.44
United Kingdom 2.49 0.46 0.63 0.00
Uruguay 1.65 0.64 1.72 0.61
US 2.61 0.26 0.52 0.48
Vietnam 0.49 0.03   1.55 0.31
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